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ABSTRACT
There were a few thousand Polish communists in Soviet Russia in the first years after the October 
Revolution. The Polish Bureau of Agitation and Propaganda at the Russian Communist Party [Bolsheviks] 
– the so-called Polbiuro – was the most important agenda of Polish communists. This article concerns the 
position of Polish communists in the Soviet state, their role in the Polish-Bolshevik War, activity amongst 
the Polish population in post-revolutionary Russia as well as amongst Polish POWs. The article is an 
attempt to answer the question: how to evaluate the activity of Polish communists in the Soviet country 
in the first years after the revolution? Text is based mainly on archival material from the Russian State 
Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) in Moscow and collections of a few Ukrainian and Polish 
archives (Donetsk, Warsaw).
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The Polish-Bolshevik War, known also as the War of 1920, in the Soviet and 
Russian historiography was called the Polish War. The war, being crucial for the 
Polish statehood, was extremely important in the history of the communist movement 
in Poland. In fact, the substantial part of Polish communists stayed in Russia during 
the years of 1918–1922; however, there are difficulties in determining the number 
of Poles in the territories under the Soviet rule before 1926. 
1 The article is based on the paper “Not Only Dzerzhinsky. Polish Communists in Soviet Russia, 
1918–1922”, presented during the 47th Annual Convention ASEEES, session: Revolutions, Refugees and 
Relations in War, 1918–1922, Philadelphia, PA, November 19–22, 2015.
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Polish communists in Russia were interested in showing the largest possible 
number of Poles. According to the so-called Polbiuro (Polish Bureau of the Russian 
Communist Party [Bolsheviks]), the most important Polish agenda in Soviet Russia, 
in August 1921 the number of Poles was not less than 3,000,000 of which the largest 
concentrations were in the former provinces of Belarus: Minsk, Gomel, Vitebsk, and 
Right Bank of Ukraine. On the Right Bank the most numerous Polish population 
was registered in Proskuriv, Berdychiv, Kamianets districts, and in the cities: Kiev, 
Odessa, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Zhytomyr and Berdychiv. There were much less 
Poles on the Left Bank of Ukraine. However, the number of 3,000,000 seems to be 
exaggerated. According to the Soviet data from 1921, Polish nationality declared up 
to 395,000 persons residing in the territory of Russia, but we have no information on 
the subject from Ukraine and Belarus from this year. So, taking into consideration 
different sources (i.a. data of rescue and repatriation committees, Red Cross, etc.), 
we can estimate the number of Poles in the Soviet state shortly after the end of the 
Civil War at 1,200,000–1,500,000 people [Iwanow 1991: 30–33; Materski 2005: 
131–132; Kupczak 1994: 38–39, 47; Nesterenko 2010: 87]. 
According to the first Census of Population of USSR, there were about 520,000 
Poles in the Soviet Union in 1926. In fact, this figure is an underestimate. Actually, 
the local Belarusian and Ukrainian administration created a new, large category of 
Belarusians and Ukrainians of Roman-Catholic rite. As admitted by the director of the 
Regional Statistical Office in Minsk in 1926, the Census data was ‘targeted consistent 
campaign of discrimination against the Polish population in Ukraine and Belarus’. 
Although since the end of the Civil War and the Polish-Bolshevik War assimilation pro-
gressed, the number of Poles was diminished by census enumerators in Soviet Ukraine 
and Belarus, and this concerned also the Orthodox Poles and mixed marriages. Some 
Poles due to fear of reprisals did not want to divulge true nationality, so the number 
of Poles in those republics has been underestimated, and most authors estimated that 
number at 782,000 (0.53% of total number of population) [Masiarz 2004: 73–74]. It 
is difficult to specify the number of Polish children living in non-Polish orphanages 
in the Soviet Union, and the so-called bezprizorni (street children).
The majority of this population was Roman Catholic. Before the Russian revo-
lutions and in the early years of the Soviet rule the social life of Poles concentrated 
mostly around the parishes and churches. The communists were aware of the an-
ti-Soviet sentiment of the Catholic clergy in areas inhabited by the Polish population, 
and effectively tried to liquidate the Church structures and deprive of its normal 
functioning. The clergy were harassed, and, more frequently, forced to emigrate2 . 
The Polish population in the Soviet state was not homogenous. The largest group 
stated Poles from the Eastern Borderlands (in Polish Kresy), mainly farmers living 
2 There are many publications (monographs and sources’ editions) on the Polish minority and situ-
ation of the Catholic Church in the Soviet Union in the Polish historiography. There is selected literature 
at the end of the article. 
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on the Right Bank of Ukraine and Belarus. Although many of them did not know 
the Polish language, they retained a strong sense of cultural identity and ethnicity. 
Among this group there were also people of Ukrainian, Belarusian and even Russian 
origin, who have adopted Catholicism. for majority of those groups, Poland was not 
a real historical existence, but rather a symbolic, longed-for homeland.
Another group formed emigration from the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
(among which there were the most skilled workers, craftsmen, intellectuals, engi-
neers, former tsarist officials and the military). Apart from a small group of prisoners 
of war from the years of the first World War who chose or were forced to remain 
in Russia, there were also civil refugees and deportees, as well as people – mainly 
political prisoners – deported from the Polish lands before 1914 and their descend-
ants. The least numerous were the communists, activists of the Polish and Russian 
communist parties, and people with the leftist views. Some of them emigrated from 
Poland during or shortly after the end of the Polish-Bolshevik War; the others were 
deported by the Polish authorities for ideological and political reasons (i.e. sabotage, 
espionage, communist propaganda and agitation). In this group were not only Poles 
but also people of Jewish origin, who considered themselves as Poles or declared 
Russian nationality [Budnitskii 2012: 47–50, 90–109; Pipes 1995: 260–261, 312–326, 
339–342; Schatz 1991: 31; Shternshis 2006: 82–105; Zieliński 2013: 94–103].
***
for Polish communists, the agitation and propaganda among Poles in the Soviet 
Union was very difficult. They had much less to offer than, for example, Jewish 
communists, who rightly pointed to the fact that anti-Semitism, at least officially, 
disappeared. Of course, the real anti-Semitism has not disappeared with taking pow-
er by the communists, and in subsequent years even deepened, but the Bolsheviks 
condemned the massacres and pogroms. There were Jews among the high ranks of 
new authorities, and especially indifferent religiously Jewish youth was relatively 
easy to seduce by visions of the new, fair state [Budnitskii 2012: 67; Slezkine 2004: 
172–174; Zieliński 2013: 95–96]. 
Poles were the fourteenth nationality in Russia in terms of numbers, but taking 
into consideration the number of communists – members of the Russian and other 
communist parties – the Poles occupied the seventh position; so, the number of 
communists of Polish origin in relation to the number of total Polish population in 
the Soviet country was relatively large. According to the official Soviet data, ‘Polish’ 
party members in relation to the total number of Polish population were 3 times more 
numerous than showed similar indicators for the Russians, 7 times more numerous 
than the Belarusians and 10 times more numerous than the communist Ukrainians. 
In 1922, Polish communists in the Soviet country accounted approximately 1% of 
the total Polish population, while the proportion of communists among the general 
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population of the state is 0.29%. In terms of numbers it was the fourth group after 
Russians, Ukrainians and Jews [Kostiuszko 2005: 45; Kupczak 1994: 81–82]3. It is 
worth noting that the number of communist Poles in Russia outnumbered the number 
of communists in Poland (according to the Soviet data, the number of them was esti-
mated at 15,000 to 18,000, while in Poland in mid-1919 only 10,000). Although the 
majority of Poles in Russia was neutral to the collapse of the tsarist regime and the 
revolutions, nearly 8,000 of them took an active part in the Civil War [Butkiewicz, 
Ślisz 1987: 171; Cimek 2011: 29; Najdus 1971: 19–21; Świetlikowa 1968: 72–73]. 
What is more, Poles held significant positions at all levels and instances of the 
party, infamous Cheka (chrezvychaynaya komissiya, Emergency Committee) and 
military. Old, meritorious comrades, as Marchlewski, Dzerzhinsky, Radek belonged 
to the elite of the party and the government. 
In the first years after the October Revolution, the activity of Polish communists 
in Soviet Russia, like communists of other nationalities and ethnicities, was under the 
directives from the Kremlin. It refers to all collective bodies that joined communists, 
namely Poles or those who were believed to be Poles. As I have mentioned, Polbiuro 
should be considered as the most important one in referring to a collective body. 
The Bureau was located in Moscow, and it fully represented the business of Polish 
communists in Russia. It was also the most important Polish body in the Bolshevik 
party, a party which was in fact above any Soviet state institutions. Moreover, some 
members of the Bureau were outstanding, distinguished revolutionaries, and high-
ly-regarded figures in Polish as well as Russian and German working class movement. 
Among them were: Marchlewski, Dzerzhinsky, Kon, Unszlicht, Radek, etc4 .
The Polish Bureau of the Communist Party was officially approved in 1919. 
It did not repeat the activity of Polish Section of the People’s Commissariat of 
Nationalities, which had been active since 1917 (Polish section was the first out of 
sixteen ethnic sections of the Commissariat). Polbiuro was a ‘child’ of Lenin’s ethnic 
policy, Bolshevik decision makers, and the theory of permanent revolution, which 
Soviet Russia was planning to carry into the West. Despite their own ambitions, in 
order to keep up with the general policy of Moscow, Polish communists could only 
become a part of Bolsheviks’ plans and try to force through both their viewpoints 
and particularistic interests. Paradoxically, their biggest success was the fact that they 
convinced Lenin to conduct an armed confrontation with Poland [Davies 2006: 87, 
184–185; Trembicka 1986/1987: 179–80]. However, that ‘success’ turned out to be 
their defeat at the same time, because the war result put an end to dreams about ‘the 
3 See also archival documents: RGASPI Russian National Archive of Social-Political History in 
Moscow (further RGASPI) Polish Bureau of Agitation and Propaganda at the Central Committee of the 
Russian Communist Party [Bolsheviks] (further f. 63) op. 1 d. 207, pp. 2–3.
4 Archive of Modern Acts in Warsaw (further AAN) Central Executive of the Polish Communist 
Workers’ Party (further KPRP) 397/I-18 p. 18; RGASPI f. 63 op. 1 d. 26 p. 1–8; RGASPI f. 63 op. 1 d. 
27 p. 1, 9, 16–20; RGASPI f. 63 op. 1 d. 29 p. 2; RGASPI f. 63 op. 1 d. 30 p. 6–7, 20–21; RGASPI f. 63 
op. 1 d. 82 p. 34; RGASPI f. 63 op. 1 d. 207 p. 2–3, 7; RGASPI f. 63 op. 1 d. 209 p. 14.
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red flag waving in Warsaw’ and the Polish Republic of Soviets, a component of the 
European or worldwide federation of Soviet Russia.
However, after the October Revolution, the communist ideology was popular 
in the majority of states of East-Central Europe [Berend 2001: 65–69; Mendelsohn 
1983: 2, 45; Rothschild 1998: 105, 142, 214–215, 295, 333–335, 372]. Let us look 
at the situation in Hungary. 
Many Hungarian soldiers, coming from workers’ and peasants’ milieus, found 
themselves in Russian POW camps during the war. They returned to Hungary from 
Russia where their observations and experiences during 1917 and 1918 had converted 
them into communists. In fact, some of them had participated to considerable effect in 
the Russian Revolution and Civil War. At the conference in Moscow on November 4, 
1918, they had resolved to found a Hungarian Communist Party, firstly as a Hungarian 
Group of the Russian Communist Party [Bolsheviks], and to send a few hundred of 
their agitators to Budapest. Its leader Béla Kun, an officer in the Austrian-Hungarian 
army, coming from the wealthy Jewish family in Budapest, returned to Hungary in 
November 1918, and started to deal with revolutionary movement. Despite the arresting 
of a few communist leaders, the party continued to prepare the revolution and to fulfill 
the resolution of the Communist International (Comintern). Kun and his comrades 
assumed that their revolution was a part of general European communist revolution 
and the beginning – as the first steps in this European revolution – of local upheavals in 
Germany and Austria. The ‘Reds’ came to power largely thanks its organized fighting 
force; they promised that Hungary would defend its territory without conscription, 
possibly with the help of the Soviet Red Army. The newly established Socialist Party 
of Hungary (communists and social-democrats) declared its intent to introduce the 
dictatorship of proletariat and to defend the national interests. The Budapest garrison 
offered its assistance, and a bloodless revolution introduced the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat and established the Hungarian Council’s Republic (March 21, 1919). However, 
the rule of communists turned out to be short-lived (133 days). On August 1, 1919, the 
Hungarian Council’s Republic collapsed. A dozen years later the Hungary found itself 
in the German-Italian camp [Berend 2001: 124–129; Rothschild 1998: 142, 145–151]. 
Returning to Polish communists: Polbiuro was supposed to be a specialized 
institution dealing with Polish matters in the Soviet state. In the first years of its ex-
istence, the structure of Bureau was closely related to the war and military purposes. 
During the Polish-Bolshevik War of 1920 and its aftermath, the main part of Polbiuro 
activity was agitation and propaganda, and political work among returned expatri-
ates, re-emigrants and prisoners of war. They were supposed to be won over and 
got in touch with communist parties that were active in the countries of their origin. 
Responsible sections of Polbiuro and other collegial bodies of Polish communists 
in Russia were supposed to preliminary train and recruit agents abroad and among 
the Poles in the Republic of Soviets [Nowak 2001: 546; Zieliński 2013: 325].  
In July 1920, the Polish Bureau of the Russian Communist Party [Bolsheviks] 
was transformed into Provisional Polish Revolutionary Committee, the so-called 
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Polrevkom. Theoretically, it was a new, temporary Polish government, but it seems 
to be more accurate to say that this was a Białystok branch (a headquarter of a new 
government was in this city) of Polish Bureau [Zieliński 2013: 18; Żenczykowski 
1988: 43]. Polrevkom turned out to be an important and spectacular institution, but 
at the same time the short-term and failing episode in the activity of Polish Bureau. 
What is more, its short existence had a negative impact on the development of the 
communist movement in Poland. far-reaching plans of Polish communists and hopes 
associated with the Polish-Bolshevik War for having the main role in a new Poland 
collapsed after the Battle of Warsaw.
However, the ceasefire and the Riga Treaty did not mean the end of the activity of 
Polish communists. The many Poles still lived in the Soviet state, and the communists 
had to take care of them and to persuade them to a new system. After the armistice, 
it became a main task of the Polish Bureau and its local branches.
The first local Polish bureau was established at the end of 1918 in Petrograd (it 
is estimated that 150–160,000 of the total population of the city and its vicinity were 
Poles). The further branches were created depending on the number of Polish population 
and availability of staff. In March 1921, functioned 8 branches: Moscow, Petersburg, 
Kharkov, Rostov-on-Don, Baku, Tashkent, Novo-Nikolaevsk in Siberia and Minsk 
(Polish Bureau in Minsk operated under the auspices of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Belarus). In May 1921, there were 58 Polish bureaus, in Septem-
ber – 81. In November of that year, there were 7 district bureaus and 44 provincial 
ones (including the territory of the RSfSR – 17, in Siberia – 8, in Donetsk Region – 4, 
in Ukraine – 11, and Belarus – 4). After repatriation and evacuation of refugees and 
POWs due to the decreasing number of the Polish population these numbers decreased. 
It was estimated that the number of Polish communists registered by the Polish bureaus 
reached 15–18,000, but some people still served in the Red Army, others after returning 
from the fronts did not want to register. There are no data from most villages in Belarus 
and almost the whole of Ukraine [Zieliński 2013: 76–89].
What did Polish communists in the Soviet state do? Some activities of this group 
should be interpreted as positivist ‘work at the grass roots level’. What is meant here 
is a wide educational activity which was carried out despite the lack of financial 
support and personnel. The very important things were teaching children and fight-
ing against illiteracy, including the illiteracy among POWs. Of course, ideological 
content was interwoven with education, although, it should not be presupposed that 
people learning how to read and write were doing it in order to transfer revolution 
into their country. The same can be stated about organization of re-evacuation, 
which was supervised and supported by Polish bureaus. from the technical side it 
was protected by Polish communists. Repeated interventions in dreadful welfare and 
living conditions, food supplies, corruption in camps and transit points of Polbiuro 
emissaries and pol-otdiels (Polish units) were sometimes successful. The anticipa-
tion of the return to their native country and the way home were more tolerable for 
many Polish refugees owing to the so-called Polish politrabotniki (political workers) 
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who accompanied echelons [Leinwand 2008: 97–100; Stadnik 2004: 120–121]5 . 
Undoubtedly, what seems to be the most important from Bolshevik point of view, 
massive departures of refugees, returned expatriates and POWs gave chances to sneak 
agents and smuggle literature and propaganda materials for communists in Poland.
The activities connected with war, such as mobilization, the development of 
propaganda, organization of sabotage at the enemy’s rear overlapped with the first 
stage of policy named korienisatsia. This term is meant, in this case, as policy of 
‘accustoming’ Poles who lived and stayed in the Republic of Soviets with the com-
munist ideology, trying to use their national aspirations rather than fighting with them. 
The main objectives of bureaus and sections were to integrate a particular national 
minority into a communist program, discredit ‘bourgeois’ scientific centres, eliminate 
centrifugal tendencies, widespread procommunist agitation and propaganda both in 
Russia and lands controlled by the Bolsheviks as well as neighboring countries. It 
must be admitted that it was extremely difficult to make attempts to respect Polish 
identity and at the same time to connect it with communism.
Although shortly after the Riga Treaty, in 1922 the massive re-evacuation and 
repatriation of Poles from the Soviet state were finished, many Poles lived in the 
‘new’ Russia. The number of activities aimed at Polish population was substantial. 
Activists of Polbiuro were able to motivate some of those people, even though they 
appeared to be resistant to ideological load coming from the tribune or numerous 
brochures and newspapers. In fact, it is difficult to estimate the level of ‘red infection’ 
among the Poles in Soviet Russia: how to estimate the activity of Polbiuro and other 
Polish communist institutions towards Polish children, particularly war orphans? 
Re. the last question, on the one hand, the positive side to this activity was undoubt-
edly needed children’s protection. The most important advantages of the existence 
of Polish schools and orphanages were, for example, meeting peers and teachers 
from the same village, having the same religious background or speaking the same 
mother tongue. The workers of Polish bureaus not only controlled social conditions, 
food supplies and the quality of education, but also they tried to transfer children to 
a Soviet-Polish orphanage if a village did not have one or it was to be closed down. 
We should remember that the Soviet state never managed to deal with the problem of 
bezprizornost (leaving children without any care or protection), which could be avoid-
ed by sending a child to a school or an orphanage. On the other hand, Polish schools 
and orphanages involved elimination of current educational system and repressions 
towards those teachers and Catholic priests that were not considered humble6. What is 
more, Polish communists tried to prevent children who were thought to have relatives 
in Poland from leaving the Republic of Soviets [Stadnik 2004: 131]. This fact was 
5 Primary sources on the subject: RGASPI f. 63 op. 1 d. 45 p. 25. RGASPI f. 63 op. 1 d. 203 p. 19.
6 National Archive of the Donetsk Oblast in Donetsk (further GADO) Archive of the Communist 
Party of the Donetsk Oblast (further f. 1-2442) op. 1 d. 370 p. 24; op. 1 d. 62 p. 85; RGASPI f. 63 op. 1 
d. 46 p. 35.
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against the Treaty of Riga and also morally ambiguous, however, Polish communists 
really believed that keeping orphaned children in Soviet state would create a better 
future for them and save them from falling into ‘destructive bourgeois and clerical 
influences’. Euphemistically speaking, seeking for those children’s relatives in Poland 
in order to send them back to their native country as a part of repatriation was not 
too intense, because searches were often given up, newspaper advertisements were 
not sent to Polish press, and there were many administrative obstacles. It should be 
admitted that preventing as many Polish people as possible from leaving the Soviet 
state was in Polish communists’ interests. It could justify further work of Polish com-
munists, especially that they were convinced that they would be the best promoters of 
communism in the Polish nation owing to their origin, knowledge of Polish language 
and culture. The majority of those communists had never abandoned the hope for 
returning to Poland7. Paradoxically, belief in it helped Poland take back some artifacts 
of Polish culture and art monuments taken to Russia before 1918. At the Treaty of 
Riga the leading member of Polbiuro Leszczyński-Leński’s argument concerning 
those monuments prevailed over all other statements. He said that those items were 
the property of Polish proletariat, and Polish proletariat was eventually going to take 
over the authority in Poland [Kostiuszko 2005: 101; Kumaniecki 1991: 167].
Taking care of Polish prisoners of war, despite the fact that the communists 
planned to recruit among them members of the Polish Communist Workers’ Party 
and agents in Poland, was very important, too. Accessible materials are not enough 
to state that Polish communists were successful in this field. However, the fact that 
POWs could turn to Polish-speaking people with their problems was an unquestion-
able advantage. Their stay in prisoner-of-war camps was undoubtedly easier due to 
the presence of Polish workers and instructors [Zieliński 2013: 197–198]. 
It should be emphasized that among all repatriates to Poland, POWs were a par-
ticular category. In autumn 1918 in Russia, there were Polish soldiers who served 
during the first World War in German and Austrian formations, however, the prob-
lem of prisoners of war in all its complexity stood before the Bolsheviks and Polish 
communists in Russia after counteroffensive of the Red Army in 1920. The number 
of Polish POWs is difficult to estimate, and varies from 30 to 60,000. Officials of the 
Polish section of Polish Repatriation Office talked about nearly 30,000 prisoners, but 
in the note of Polbiuro at the end of 1920 we found a number approximately 60,000 
[Achmatowicz 1996: 186; Kostiuszko 2005: 52; Leinwand 2008: 95]. Probably these 
differences are due to the fact that they were soldiers of different fronts and years, 
as well as civilians and hostages.
The POWs stayed in dozens of camps, mainly in Soviet Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus, however, some of them were sent to civilian camps. In general, the soldiers 
were separated from the officers, civilians and the Whites. Recommendations for 
the registration and categorization of prisoners were very detailed. In a report dated 
7 RGASPI f. 63 op. 1 d. 47 p. 17.
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29 September 1920 we can read that: ‘officers, priests, people from the privileged 
classes, intellectuals, people openly hostile to the Soviet state are to be spun off into 
a separate group and sent back farther separately from the other prisoners to specially 
designated camps’. These people belonged to the third category, and the political 
work among them did not promise any hope. for the first and second categories, 
potentially ‘loyal’, belonged respectively: workers, farm workers and small-holders, 
wealthier peasants and the ‘petty-bourgeois elements’. Each category was, as far as 
possible, deposited in separate camps. This division concerned treatment of prisoners, 
too. One escaped from captivity Polish officer in his report for the delegation of the 
Red Cross stated that there are not officers’ camps in Russia, and the officers often 
go to the prisons where their life ‘is really slow agony’ [Leinwand 2008: 98–99].
The best and the most experienced communist agitators were sent to POWs’ 
camps. In the already quoted report, dated 29 September 1920 we can read that 
the political commissar’s duties include: ‘caring for the needs of prisoners, closer 
familiarization with them and supplying them with literature’. The role of political 
commissars, cooperating with local committees of the party, was big: they had a right 
to countersign all camp commandants’ regulations, chiefs of concentration points and 
heads of echelons8. The central Polish Bureau even applied for replacing the camp 
commandants by Polish instructors-agitators, which would bring better results in the 
work of agitation and propaganda. It is possible that such requests were motivated 
by a desire to curb corruption that took place in many camps. forms of work with 
prisoners included speeches, lectures, overviews of newspapers, reading fragments 
of revolutionary literature, etc. but also courses for illiterates. Prisoners daily or 
almost daily received, carefully chosen, Polish newspapers published in Russia or 
legal and illegal titles issued by the Polish communists in the country and relevant 
parts of ‘bourgeois newspapers’ from Poland. In addition to courses for illiterates, 
classes in arithmetic, economic history and the history of the labor movement were 
conducted. Meetings were arranged in the camps or the factory halls, warehouses, 
public facilities, clubs of Polish workers and youth, confiscated manors and churches9 . 
In total, according to the Polish Bureau, there were approximately 24,000 pris-
oners in 34 camps on the territory of Central Russia and Siberia in 1921, and worked 
among them only 34 political instructors. However, there was established 11 schools 
for illiterates, 5 well-equipped libraries and 9 workers’ clubs. The instructors orga-
nized 99 rallies, 151 lectures, 932 meetings. The 11 communists’ circles were estab-
lished (with 123 members and candidates for the party) and 6 schools for members 
of the party. Nearly 200 people joined the Red Army10. According to other sources, 
in 37 camps in Central Russia and Siberia in May 1921, stayed 32,000 POWs among 
whom worked 45 instructors. They established 29 schools for illiterates, 37 librar-
8 RGASPI f. 63 op. 1 d. 82 p. 26.
9 AAN KPRP 397/I-20 p. 81; RGASPI f. 63 op. 1 d. 203 p. 19.
10 RGASPI f. 63 op. 1 d. 25 pp. 31–37. 
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ies, 15 clubs and reading rooms, 12 theaters and theatrical circles, 42 circles party, 
9 party schools and 544 meetings were organized [Kostiuszko 2005: 16]. Despite 
the accuracy of these data, ideological ballast and motivation of Polish communists, 
the Polish Bureau and other agencies working among prisoners contributed to the 
reduction of illiteracy among soldiers, especially from the poor peasant families. It 
should be emphasized that this work due to the lack of staff, was not easy. A political 
work of the Polish communists in Russia over the Polish POWs brought little result. 
Actually, there is lack of information about signing up the communist party cards 
by Polish prisoners of the Polish-Bolshevik War. 
The Bolshevik revolution did not spread throughout Central and Eastern Europe, 
therefore, the dreams of Polish communists failed. Although majority of them joined 
the fronts of the Russian Civil War, many were involved in the war with Poland. They 
believed that they are able to establish a ‘new, better world’ in Poland, but it does 
not change the fact that they acted in the interest of the Comintern (III Communist 
International), and they served the Soviet foreign policy. The same we can say about 
Béla Kun and his comrades [Rothschild 1998: 145–146]. Summing up, however, 
the presence of Polish communists (or – analogically – Hungarian, Slovak, Czech, 
Romanian, etc. communists) among the Polish POWs should be estimated positive-
ly. The presence of Poles and Polish-speaking people among the staff of the camps 
often facilitated the daily life of prisoners, like in the case of Polish repatriates and 
refugees waiting for return home. 
As I have already mentioned, the Riga Treaty ending the Polish-Bolshevik War 
did not mean the end of the activity of Polish communists. In autumn 1922, feliks 
Kon and Julian Marchlewski held a lecture at the Comintern conference in Moscow. 
They spoke out for creating Polish autonomous territorial and administrative units 
in Soviet Ukraine and Belarus close to the Polish border [Zieliński 2013: 325]. At 
that time, a base for the ‘Polish experiment’ was well prepared. A new phase in the 
history of the Polish minority in Soviet state begins. 
The assessment of the activity of Polish communists in the Republic of Soviets 
in the years 1918–1922 must be ambivalent. Their attitude towards their country 
was indeed paranoid: despite all ideological reasons, to some extent their activity 
was a kind of treason. They fought shoulder to shoulder with the Red Army against 
Poland, their newly established country. Nevertheless, those passionate communists 
were really interested in making the Polish Soviet Republic, and underlined ‘Polish’ 
character of this Republic. Despite the ideological burdens, providing help to Polish 
children, POWs, refugees of the Great War and repatriates from all over the Soviet 
state deserves a positive assessment.
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